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Abstract
Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) zone formed in 1992 was one of the first formal
initiatives that aimed to develop economic cooperation between countries that were once members
of two adversary alliances of the Cold War era. Greece and Turkey, the NATO-affiliated members
of BSEC, became partners with their formerly communist neighbors: Albania, Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation and Ukraine. The
partnership required cooperation in quite a comprehensive list of areas including trade but without
providing a basis for any preferential treatment for trade between members. The purpose of this
paper is to consider the BSEC experience in seeking an answer to whether regional economic
cooperation in the broader sense could lead to any trade creation/diversion effects even when the
cooperating partners do not liberalize their trade policy among themselves and/or harmonize their
policy towards third parties. For this purpose, the paper evaluates the effects of BSEC on regional
trade flows by investigating, in particular, the magnitude of any trade creating effects BSEC might
so far have generated upon regional flows, and tries to assess the significance of the role it might
have played in hindering the diverted trade that had been going on among its members that were
once partners within the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA or COMECON). The
empirical part of the investigation is carried out by employing the gravity framework. A salient
feature of the empirical analysis in the paper is the use of pooled time series and cross-section
observations within a gravity framework. The empirical results obtained revealed that the formation
of BSEC significantly affected trade flows in the region consistently leading to increased trade volumes
among members, and causing variations in the volume of trade between members and non-members.
Keywords : Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), Trade Creation/Diversion,
  Gravity Models.
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1. Introduction
Prior to the disintegration in the late 1980s of the Soviet Bloc and then the Soviet Union itself, most of
the economies in Eastern Europe were members of CMEA/COMECON (Council of Mutual Economic
Assistance) that was formed to divert trade away from the market economies in the West.
1 The
development under Soviet planning of strong input-output linkages between industries in different
countries/republics led to a significant degree of complementarity between member economies. This
complementarity successfully diverted trade away from non-members facilitating the maintenance of
high degrees of in-bloc self-sufficiency. The feasibility of barter trade among members also contributed
to this process by helping these countries overcome their hard currency constraints (Gultekin and
Mumcu, 1996). Following the collapse of the Soviet Bloc and hence CMEA, both the ex-Soviet
republics gaining independence, and the formerly socialist nations of Eastern Europe became exposed to
competition among the market economies for global markets. A considerable portion of trade in these
markets was controlled by regional trade blocs. So, when Turkey, a neighboring market economy, called
for the formation of a regional economic cooperation zone among the countries around the Black Sea in
1990, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria,  Georgia,  Moldova, Romania and Russia immediately responded
by sending their representatives to Ankara, Turkey to discuss the project. At the end of the Ankara
meeting, the representatives declared officially that they agreed to form a Black Sea Economic
Cooperation (BSEC) zone together with Turkey. Other transition economies in the region also viewed
Turkey as a likely source of financial and technical assistance, and the group was soon joined by Ukraine
first and then Albania. Greece also applied to join in and was granted membership. With the signing of
BSEC Summit Declaration in July 1992 in Istanbul,
2 BSEC was born as one of the first regional
                                                       
1  The only exceptions were (former) Yugoslavia and Albania (which joined in 1949 but withdrew in
1962).
2 The full text of the BSEC Summit Declaration can be found in BSEC (1995), pp. 3-6. On-line versions of the
document can be accessed at either of the following URLs:
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupf/bsec7.htm  and  http://turkey.org/turkey/bsec7.htm.1
organizations aiming to develop economic cooperation between the members of two adversary
alliances of the Cold War era: NATO and the Warsaw Pact.
3
At the time of the formation of BSEC, only the NATO-affiliated members, Greece and
Turkey, had market economies, whereas the other nine were still centrally planned economies with
practically no private sector involvement in economic activities. Due to this special composition of
its membership, and the special nature of their experience, BSEC emerged as, and has remained, a
special regional arrangement (Sayan and Zaim, 1998).
4 It has worked since 1992 to facilitate the
growth of natural (as opposed to diverted) trade between its members. However, instead of
requiring its members to reduce or eliminate any conventional (tariff or non-tariff) barriers within
the cooperation zone, BSEC aimed to help relax structural constraints preventing larger volumes
of trade between members by contributing to the transition process its ex-socialist members had to
go through.
The purpose of this paper is to consider the experience of BSEC in seeking an answer to
whether regional economic cooperation in the broader sense could lead to any trade creation/diver-
sion effects even when the cooperating partners do not liberalize their trade policy among
themselves and/or harmonize their policy towards third parties. For this purpose, the paper
evaluates the effects of BSEC on regional trade flows by investigating, in particular, the magnitude
of any trade creating effects BSEC might so far have generated upon regional flows, and tries to
assess the significance of the role it might have played in hindering the diverted trade that had been
going on among its members that were once partners within CMEA. The empirical part of the
investigation is carried out by employing the gravity framework.
The organization of the paper is as follows. The next section describes the nature of
cooperation within BSEC. Section 3 explains the implementation of the gravity model and presents
                                                       
3 The Council of Baltic Sea States (CBS) formed a few months before BSEC is another similar
organization. See, OECD (1997) for information on the membership composition and the goals of CBS.
4 Another reason why BSEC is so special is that it is perhaps the only regional cooperation organization in
which some of the members impose trade embargos upon others. Azerbaijan and Armenia, for example,
have been at odds for a long time due to their dispute over Nagorno-Karabagh and do not have any trade
relations. Similarly, Turkey which backs Azerbaijan in the dispute, has been applying a trade embargo
upon Armenia. Despite somee border trade going on between Armenia and Turkey, official trade statistics
of Turkey show zero trade to this country (Sayan and Zaim, 1998).2
estimation results. Finally, Section 4 completes the paper with a general discussion of findings and
conclusions to be drawn.
2. The Nature of the Cooperation through BSEC
By conventional trade theory, the fundamental motivation behind regional arrangements is to improve
the welfare of members through a reduction or elimination of barriers to trade in the region. The
members of the regional arrangement would enjoy welfare gains as long as welfare-improving trade
creation (TC) effects exceed welfare-reducing trade diversion (TD) effects. TC arises when domestic
production in a certain sector of a member country is replaced, in part or as a whole, by imports from
another member which has a comparative advantage in the production of that sector's output. Since the
member with a comparative advantage is, by definition, a country which produces that output at a lower
cost, i.e., more efficiently, there are welfare gains associated with trade creation. TD, on the other hand,
occurs when the elimination of barriers upon imports from partners lowers the cost of those imports
below the cost of imports from more efficient third parties, as the latter remains artificially high due to
the maintenance of restrictions on third party imports. Naturally, such a switch from more to less
efficient producers would decrease the importing member’s welfare.
While this is the standard framework for analyzing the potential welfare effects of regional
arrangements formed to facilitate trade among market economies, applying it to the case of BSEC
requires special attention to be paid to the peculiar characteristics of member economies and the nature
of cooperation within BSEC. This warning follows from the fact that unlike other forms of regional
arrangements among market economies, the BSEC agreement does not directly provide for any trade
preferences for countries within the group (OECD, 1997). Since it does require strong commitments
towards harmonization of commercial policies vis-a-vis third parties, or reductions in tariff or non-tariff
measures for trade among members, cooperation through BSEC would not change the relative costs in
domestic markets of imports from member and non-member countries. For this reason, neither trade
diversion nor trade creation effects in the sense described above are likely to arise due solely to BSEC
membership. However, by helping sources of imports get diversified for each of its members, BSEC
could potentially help reverse the trend of diverted trade that had been going on between ex-Soviet Bloc
partners prior to its formation. If realized, this would naturally have a welfare-improving impact upon
members. BSEC could also help increase the welfare of its members by lowering barriers to trade
between the member countries. But unlike those analyzed in the existing integration literature, the3
barriers in this context are not of the type that the nations artificially erect by introducing tariff and non-
tariff measures of protection which, once decided, could be removed instantaneously. Instead, the
barriers to trade between BSEC members are structural barriers that have been formed over long periods
of time, and even in the presence of political will, most of them can not be eliminated as quickly as
conventional barriers (Sayan, 1997; Sayan and Zaim, 1998). Yet, to the extent BSEC is successful in
facilitating reductions in these barriers, it will help create trade in a slightly different sense than the one
suggested by the conventional definition of TC.
It is the recognition of the special structural conditions of the members that shaped the
cooperation arrangement expected of BSEC to create. It was recognized during the multilateral talks
preceding the establishment of BSEC that full economic integration would not be an a priori
commitment for the participants, even though consideration to such integration could be given later on in
the process of cooperation.
5 Cooperation would be developed gradually by taking into account "the
specific economic conditions, interests and concerns of the countries involved, and particularly the
problems of the countries in transition to market economy" (Article 10). The priorities for different areas
of cooperation would be determined in the process with "the achievement of a higher degree of
integration of the Participating States into the world economy" (Article 5) set as a major goal. Within this
framework, the participating states agreed (Article 14) to promote cooperation  by contributing, among
others,
... to the expansion of their mutual trade in goods and services and ensuring conditions
favorable to such development by continuing their efforts to further reduce or
progressively eliminate obstacles of all kinds, in a manner not contravening their
obligations towards third parties. [Emphasis Added.] (BSEC, 1995: 5)
Given the special composition of BSEC membership, the reference in this Article to the
reduction/elimination of  "obstacles" must not be viewed as a call for a removal of conventional barriers
to trade. It must be viewed, instead, as a call for cooperation towards a relaxation of structural
constraints that played a more important role in preventing larger volumes of pre-BSEC trade between
members –especially between transition economies joining BSEC, on the one hand, and Greece and
Turkey, on the other. In fact, Greece was a full member of the EU and Turkey was negotiating a
                                                       
5 In fact, a “Declaration of Intent for the Establishment of BSEC Free Trade Area” was signed in February 1997
as a further step of cooperation. The actual formation of such a free trade area, however, is not likely in the near
future. (For the text of the “Declaration of Intent,” see, PABSEC, 1997).4
Customs Union agreement with it, at the time of  the formation of BSEC. So, there was actually little
leeway for BSEC to set the levels of conventional barriers independently and without contravening the
commitments with third parties. Hence, BSEC could have a potentially significant effect on trade flows
in its area only through its contribution to the removal of structural "obstacles" that had prevented larger
volumes of trade between Greece and members. In other words, the potential of BSEC to generate any
trade creation effects, or to reverse the diversion of trade between ex-CMEA partners joining BSEC
would depend on its ability to tackle the structural obstacles that existed prior to its formation.
Some of these structural obstacles have to do with the lack or inefficiency of channels for trade,
and act to suppress all bilateral trade flows between members (with the possible exception of trade
between Greece and Turkey).
6 The others cover ideological differences once existed between members
that belonged to different alliances of the Cold War era, and the associated differences in their trade
regimes. Coupled with the artificially created complementarity or interdependence between the
economies of ex-socialist members, these structural factors had effectively created two different patterns
of pre-BSEC trade between current members: i) the sizable but largely diverted trade among former
Soviet Bloc countries, and ii) relatively insignificant volumes of trade these countries had with Greece
and Turkey, despite the geographic proximity between the two groups.
Given the initial lack of private capital accumulation, and the absence of private trading
companies and commercial banks (Maurel and Cheikbossian, 1998), there were no barriers that
could easily be removed by BSEC for the purposes of welfare gains through increased trade. In fact, part
of the pre-BSEC trade that happened to take place between pairs of current members (e.g., Turkey and
Romania, or Greece and Bulgaria) was trade between NATO and Warsaw Pact members that was
carried out despite serious difficulties posed by regulations restricting trade across blocs in some sectors;
differences in property rights and trade regimes (forcing Greek and Turkish exporters to deal only with
inefficiently operating state trading companies and banks), and hard currency constraints that the then-
                                                       
6 As noted in Maurel and Cheikbossian (1998), the transportation costs in the Eastern European area were
higher than the average for the rest of the world. The high transportation costs can be attributed to the
inefficiency of channels for regional trade.5
centrally planned members faced.
7 Likewise, the lack of common product standards prevented trade
in many sectors, limiting it to mostly raw materials and primary commodities.
As for the role of structural factors that result from the lack or the inefficiency of trade channels,
the meager state of transportation and communications infrastructure that is still common to many
areas of ex-socialist members needs to be considered. Under the circumstances, increasing the
volume of trade would again take more than a(n) reduction/elimination of tariff and non-tariff
barriers through a trade liberalization agreement. Even in the complete absence of such
conventional measures of protection, the poor infrastructure for transportation and a lack of
dependable communications facilities would have imposed structural barriers, physically
preventing larger volumes of bilateral trade between any pair of the members, including those
Warsaw Pact/CMEA members (Sayan, 1996).
While some of these structural barriers such as ideological differences had been removed
before the establishment of BSEC,
8 others remained. The peculiarity of the nature of structural
obstacles assigned BSEC special roles no regional organization assumed before. The absence of a
private sector and the associated lack of private capital accumulation in ex-socialist members
posed exceptional difficulties. As this could act as a major hindrance to economic cooperation, the
organization assumed the task of helping the structural transformation of these members by
contributing to the creation of a market economy led by the private sector: Article 13 of the
Declaration required cooperation in all fields to be achieved by identifying, developing and carrying
out projects of common interest through an active participation of  private enterprises and firms,
reflecting the organization's commitment to the market economy.
The fields of cooperation were identified through a rather extensive list. While the
establishment of BSEC economic area was meant to serve first to the promotion of economic
cooperation (especially trade and industrial cooperation), it would also cover science and technology, and
the environment as well as the following areas where concrete steps towards cooperation were required:
                                                       
7 Even shortly after the emergence of BSEC, the lack of banking regulations for the financing of
international trade in some of the ex-socialist members of BSEC proved to be a major obstacle causing
many Turkish exporters to ignore orders from these countries (Sayan and Zaim, 1998).
8  As a matter of fact, BSEC could not have been formed, had these ideological differences remained.6
transport and communications, including their infrastructure; informatics; exchange of economic
and commercial information, including statistics; standardization and certification of products;
energy; mining and processing of mineral raw materials; tourism; agriculture and agro-industries;
veterinary and sanitary protection, and health care and pharmaceutics (Article 13).
The steps that BSEC has so far taken to help overcome the structural obstacles can best be
described in reference to its organizational structure. In order to secure the active participation of
private sector in accomplishing the projects of mutual interest, the BSEC Council (BSECC) was
founded in 1992. The purpose of BSECC is to provide open channels for regular interaction
between national business communities of the members and governmental bodies of the BSEC. For
this purpose, the BSECC develops and maintains a network of useful contacts through bilateral
business councils and chambers of commerce and similar national organizations.
9 The Council
operating through the Permanent Secretariat based in Istanbul is currently active in identifying
private and public investment projects that are of common interest to members.
10
The BSECC acts as the business component of a larger organizational structure which
also includes governmental, parliamentary, and financial components, and a permanent
international secretariat working under the supervision of the BSEC Sessional Chairman. The
Parliamentary Assembly (PABSEC), the parliamentary component of BSEC, was created in 1993
by the representatives of member countries other than Bulgaria and Greece. The governmental
component consists of the decision-making body, i.e., the Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign
Affairs (MMFA), the Sessional Officials Meeting, and the Working Groups (WGs) of Experts.
These WGs are subsidiary bodies established by the MMFA to deal with concrete issues of
cooperation in the areas listed above. Some of the WGs established so far are: WG on Agriculture
and Agro-Industry, WG on Banking and Finance, WG on Energy, WG on Environmental
                                                       
9 National and bilateral organizations with which the BSECC maintains regular contact are as follows:
Albania-Chamber of Commerce and Industry; Azerbaijan-State Committee of Foreign Economic
Relations; Bulgaria-Bulgarian-Turkish Business Council; Georgia-State Committee of Foreign Economic
Relations; Greece-Council for Greek-Turkish Economic Cooperation; Moldova-Ministry of Trade and
Material Resources; Romania-Romanian Electricity Authority; Russian Federation-Ministry of Foreign
Economic Relations; Turkey-Foreign Economic Relations Board; and Ukraine-Chamber of Commerce and
Industry.
10 For example, the Council reviewed project proposals for the modernization of small and medium-sized
enterprises in Bulgaria so as to recruit international partners to carry out the promising ones.7
Protection, WG on Exchange of Statistical Data and Economic Information, WG on Promotion of
Technology Transfer, WG on Cooperation in Science and Technology, WG on Cooperation in
Tourism, and WG on Avoidance of Double Taxation. These WGs have been instrumental in
completion of several projects designed the develop cooperation in respective fields including the
establishment of the BSEC Coordination Center for the Exchange of Statistical Data and Economic
Information, and the Black Sea Trade and Development Bank (BSEC, 1995). Headquartered in
Salonika, Greece, the bank represents the financial component of the BSEC structure and is in the
process of becoming the principal source of financing for implementation of joint regional projects
(Sayan and Zaim, 1998).
Joint regional projects mostly focus on areas which will help relax structural constraints
affecting the efficiency of channels for trade. Considering the importance of the issue, a Working
Group (WG) on Transport and Communications was set up very early at the beginning of the
cooperation through BSEC. Later in December 1993, this WG was divided into two as the
Working Group on Transport and the Working Group on Communications. Some of the projects
recommended by these WGs  have already been completed, including the establishment of fiber
optic communications networks and radio link systems to connect Turkey to i) Bulgaria, Romania
and Moldova (KAFOS); ii)  Italy, Ukraine and Russia (ITUR), and iii) Azerbaijan and Georgia
(DOKAP). The work on other projects aiming to integrate highways, railways and maritime lines
so as to improve the efficiency of transportation networks among members is currently under way.
(Sayan, 1996).
11
To summarize, BSEC has so far used its limited financial resources to help its members in the
process of both socio-economic transformation and the improvement of infrastructure, by initiating
cooperation in a number of fields, some of which would probably not be typical priority areas for
other regional organizations formed by market economies.
12 The question now is whether
                                                       
11 In addition to such major projects whose sizable financing needs require governmental agreements,
private sector initiatives were encouraged  as in the case of  the proposal considered by the BSECC for the
construction of  a viaduct to connect Romania and Bulgaria over the Danube (Sayan, 1996).
12 Such as establishing a parliamentary assembly like PABSEC to work for strengthening the pluralistic
democratic structure and political stability in the BSEC area. Other fields of cooperation that are more
directly related to the trade potentials of members included the standardization of products to be traded,
and harmonization of customs regulations. BSEC had also to form an ad-hoc WG (WG on Travel of8
cooperation in such areas is likely to have affected the patterns and volumes of trade within the
BSEC area. This question is taken up in the next section which investigates the potential of
regional cooperation through BSEC to generate trade creation and  trade diversion effects.
3. The Effects of BSEC on Regional Trade Flows
3.1. The Choice of Empirical Model
Possible effects of BSEC on regional trade flows are investigated in this section using a simple
gravity model. Inspired by the Newtonian laws of gravity,
13 the model is based on the argument
that trade flows between two countries must be positively related to their economic "masses"
represented by their GDPs,  and inversely related to the distance between them.
14 From an eco-
nomic point of view, the rationale behind the argument is that the potential of a country to supply
(export) products demanded by others depends on its own size as measured by its GDP, whereas
the foreign demand for these products itself depends, to a large extent, on the income (size) of the
demanding (importing) country. Thus, demand and supply potentials of trading partners can be
measured by their respective GDPs. For any given pairs of respective GDPs, the bilateral trade
potential will also be affected by the geographical distance between the countries: Trade volumes
will vary inversely with the distance since longer distances will increase the transportation costs in
terms of both freight charges and transportation time. So, in its simplest form, the model can be
represented by the following equation:
                                                                                                                                                                    
Businessmen) to assure speeding up of customs formalities, and easing national visa regulations and the
like so as to facilitate travel in the BSEC area by businessmen of member countries.
13 The Newtonian Law of Universal Gravitation states that two particles with masses m1 and m2, and
separated by a distance "d" are attracted to each other by a force, F, acting along the line joining the
particles, and the degree of attraction between two objects is directly proportional to the product of their
masses and inversely proportional to the square of the distance between them, i.e.,
F= G.(m1.m2) / d
2
where G is a universal constant having the same value for all pairs of particles.
14  The gravity model as a tool for the analysis of trade flows between countries was first introduced in the
1960s. For an early example, see Tinbergen (1962). Brief surveys of gravity literature can be found in
Deardorff (1984) and Haveman (1997). An early application of the gravity framework to trade flows
within BSEC area can be found in Togan (1994) where the estimation was based on-cross section
observations alone. Sayan (1997) and Sayan and Zaim (1998) present estimation results based on pooled





where Ei,j  is the value of exports from country i  to country j (i¹j); Yi(j) is the GDP of country i (j);
DISTij is the distance between the countries (usually between major ports or capitals of each
country),
15 and x, x, h, and ä represent parameters. Given cross-section data on exports, respective
GDPs and the distances between the economic centers of n countries, parameters of  the equation
can be estimated. Similarly, when the dependent variable is taken as imports by country i  from





In both cases, the estimated parameters are expected to be positive for x, h, m and l, and negative
for ä and t whereas estimated values for x and m can be either positive or negative.
16
Despite a lack of solid theoretical foundations (Bikker, 1987; Haveman and Hummels,
1997), the simple gravity model has performed well empirically, and proved to be popular tool for
empirical analysis in a variety of circumstances (see Deardorff, 1984, and, Oguledo and MacPhee,
1994 for surveys of the gravity literature). It is especially useful when trade flows among a large
number of countries need to be considered. Furthermore, its simplicity makes it particularly
attractive when data on other variables that are thought to have a significant effect on trade
patterns are either not available or not reliable as in the case of transition economies. The central
planning practices previously employed in these countries made relative price signals and market
determined exchange rates irrelevant to resource allocation decisions thereby rendering conventional
trade theory inapplicable.
 17 This unreliability of exchange rate and price information for these countries
imposed the choice of the gravity framework here, which, for the purposes of empirical investigation in
this section, was extended in two directions.
                                                       
15 As in the original Newtonian formulation given in Footnote 13, the masses of the bodies could be
treated as concentrated at their centers so that the distance between two bodies is measured by the distance
between their centers.
16 Because of the symmetry between Ei,j and Mj,i (i.e., since Ei,j = Mj,i ), estimating parameters in only one
of the equations in (1a) and (1b) would usually suffice. However, (the linearized versions of) both
equations are estimated here since complete data on bilateral export flows could not be found for all
countries and all periods in the sample. This point will be explained in greater detail later.
17 For this reason, gravity framework was commonly employed in the overwhelming majority of studies on
trade flows among transition economies or flows between these countries and the rest of the world See, for
example, Van Bergeijk and Oldersma (1987), Havrylysyn and Pritchett (1991), Erzan, Holmes and Safadi
(1992), Baldwin (1994), Éltetõ and Szemlér (1996), Maurel and Cheikbossian (1998).10
First, to be able to estimate any trade creating effect the establishment of BSEC might have
created on regional flows, a dummy variable was introduced to distinguish BSEC members from other
countries in the sample. This dummy variable is thought to have the potential to represent the effects of
BSEC-organized efforts towards relaxing the structural obstacles preventing larger volumes of trade.
Likewise, in order to see whether BSEC might have played a role to reverse the diverted trade that had
been going on among its ex-socialist members, another binary variable was used as a dummy to
differentiate ex-CMEA partners from others. Secondly, the estimation was carried out by pooling cross-
section and time series data. Since gravity model parameters are typically estimated using cross-section
data alone, this is a salient feature of the empirical analysis here –see also, Sayan (1997) and Sayan and
Zaim (1998).
18 The employment of pooled data enables the model to capture the possible trade effects
resulting from the dynamic nature of structural transformation that ex-communist members of BSEC
have undertaken.
The general form of gravity equations used as a basis for parameter estimation is given below:
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where Eij,t (Mij,t ) : Exports (Imports) by BSEC member i  to (from) country j  in year  t  (in
  millions of US dollars);
Yi,t : GDP  of  the BSEC member i  in year t ;
Yj,t : GDP  of country j  in year t ;
DISTij : The distance between country i and country j (in hundreds of
  miles);
(DMY
k)i,t : The value at time t of the k
th dummy variable distinguishing
  country i from others by some criterion;
k ￿ : Product sign indexed over k ˛{0,1,2}.
and the Greek characters represent parameters to be estimated.
3.2. Data and Estimation
The data problems posed special difficulties in carrying out the estimation. The unreliability of
exchange rate data, in particular, made it impossible to use dollar values of GDPs based on
                                                       
18 In the gravity literature, the studies that consider the effects of changes over time typically repeat cross-
section analysis for different years. See, for example, Aitken (1973) or Maurel and Cheikbossian (1998).11
exchange rate conversions.
19 To assure comparability of GDP data across countries, Purchasing
Power Parity (PPP) equivalents of  GDPs were used for all countries in the sample. PPP
equivalents of GDP (in billions of dollars) were obtained from various issues of the country reports
published by the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), and from various on-line editions of the World
Fact Book published by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).
The impossibility of finding complete data on bilateral flows after 1994 restricted the time
period under consideration to 1992-1994. The time index, t, in equations (2a) and (2b) was chosen
accordingly so as to have t ˛{1992, 1993, 1994}. Annual data on values of exports could be found
for only three of the BSEC members, Greece, Romania and Turkey, over the entirety of 1992-1994
period and for all countries of destination in the sample, i.e., the set of importing partners both
within and outside BSEC.
20 The set of reporting countries, i, was therefore chosen such that i ˛
{Greece, Romania, Turkey}. This implies that of the 272 possible bilateral export flows for each
year, only 48 could be taken into account if exports equation alone were estimated.
21 Since Ei,j =
Mj,i by definition, the estimation of gravity equation for imports as well makes it possible for 48
additional flows –i.e., the exports by (imports from) each of the remaining 16 countries to (by)
each of Greece, Romania and Turkey– taken into consideration. So, estimation of exports and
imports separately enables us to consider 96 of 272 bilateral flows for each year, or 288 of the 816
flows over the three year period from 1992 to 1994.
                                                       
19 During the relatively short period of time since they put an end to central planning practices, transition
economies in BSEC have experienced a sharp decline in the value of their domestic currencies and real GDPs.
Wildly fluctuating exchange rates for some countries implied a nominal depreciation against the dollar of local
currencies by hundreds  of  times a year. In addition, six of the eleven members of BSEC are brand-new
economies that used to be regions within another country (i.e., Soviet Union) just before the establishment in
1992 of BSEC. Some of them issued their own currency to replace the ruble which itself fluctuated wildly over
the sample period. Thus, reliable GDP data in dollars were not available for these economies, and it was
impossible to convert GDP data measured in domestic currency terms into common dollar terms by using
exchange rates.
20 The data on Turkish exports/imports were obtained from the Web site of Turkish State Institute of
Statistics (SIS) at http://www.die.gov.tr/BSEC/bsec.html, and were also available in various issues of
Foreign Trade Statistics published by Turkish State Institute of Statistics. For Greece and Romania, trade
figures reported in the 1996 edition of the PC/TAS data base of the WTO were used.
21 Given that the number of countries in the sample is 17, i.e., since n=17, there are a total of  n.(n-1)=
17.16=272 bilateral export values for each year. The number of export flows from each of the three
members to the remaining 16 countries is 16, and for three member countries for which complete data
were available, 48 of these bilateral flows could be accounted for.12
In choosing non-BSEC countries to be included in the sample, two criteria were observed:
i) comparability of their distances to exporting countries as importer partners within BSEC, and ii)
availability of data. Based on these criteria, the following countries were included in the sample:
Hungary and Poland that used to be partners with ex-socialist members of BSEC within CMEA,
and Egypt, Iran, Israel, Jordan and Syria, Middle Eastern countries that have maintained relatively
strong trade ties with both Greece and Turkey.
22 So, the set of partner countries, j, is such that
j ˛{Albania, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, Russian
Federation, Turkey, Ukraine, Hungary, Poland, Egypt, Iran, Israel, Jordan and
Syria}.
Linearizing equation (2a) and adding the stochastic disturbance term, ui,t, yield the
estimable form below:
ln Eij,t = x + x.ln Yi,t +  h.ln Yj,t + ä.ln DSTij + 
k ￿ n(k).ln(DMY
k)i,t + ln ui,t (3a)
Similarly, the following form was used for imports:
ln Mij,t = m + m.ln Yi,t +  l.ln Yj,t + t.ln DSTij + 
k ￿ w(k).ln(DMY
k)i,t + ln vi,t (3b)
where vi,t is the stochastic disturbance term.
Two dummy variables indexed by k  (k ª{BSEC, CMEA}) were allowed to take the value
of either e (the base to the natural logarithm) or one. The BSEC dummy took e if country i  is a
BSEC member at time t, and 1 if not. So, for all member countries, this binary variable was
assigned the value of  e for 1993 and 1994. For 1992, on the other hand, the value of BSEC
dummy was taken to be 1 even for member countries since it would be impossible for BSEC
membership to have any effects immediately after the signing of BSEC Summit Declaration in July
1992. The CMEA dummy (that was introduced to take the possibility of continuation of diverted
trade between Romania and other ex-CMEA members into consideration) was allowed to take the
value of e for the countries that are not former CMEA members, and 1 for others. Different
versions of the model were estimated using a combination of variables using pooled data over the
                                                       
22 This set of countries includes two with observer status in BSEC (Egypt and Poland), one that seeks the
observer status (Jordan) and one that seeks full membership (Iran). A member country, Armenia, on the
other hand, is excluded from the analysis on account of the lack of official trade between itself and
Turkey, and the rather small volumes of  trade it has with Greece and Romania.13
1992-1994 period with 48 cross-section observations for each year. The results from estimation of
each version are presented in Tables 1 and 2 below where t-ratios are given in parentheses.
TABLE 1. ESTIMATION RESULTS BASED ON POOLED DATA:

























































































*** : Significant at 99% *     : Significant at 90%
**   : Significant at 95% #     : Not significant at a level, 90% or higher.
TABLE 2. ESTIMATION RESULTS BASED ON POOLED DATA:
























































































*** : Significant at 99% *     : Significant at 90%
**   : Significant at 95% #     : Not significant at a level, 90% or higher.14
3.3. The Effects of BSEC on Trade Flows
These results indicate that the simple gravity model (the first lines in Tables 1 and 2) explains
bilateral exports between the reporting BSEC members and the set of importing countries in the
sample very well. Moreover, the BSEC membership has a positive effect (that is statistically
significant at the 95% confidence level) on exports/imports of BSEC members considered (the
second lines in Tables 1 and 2). The results in the third lines of the tables are for the case where the
only binary variable introduced is the CMEA dummy. In that case, the sign of CMEA dummy is
positive but the estimated parameter is not significantly different from zero at a confidence level of
90% or higher –implying that CMEA membership in the past does not affect BSEC exports. When
both dummy variables are introduced simultaneously, on the other hand, the estimated parameters
for both turn out to be positive and significantly different from zero at the 95% level in the case of
exports (the last line in Table 1). Given that the value of CMEA dummy is higher (at e) for the
countries that are not former CMEA members, this result implies that for any given level of GDPs
and distances, BSEC members are likely to export more to trade partners that are not former
CMEA members, providing additional evidence that the formation of BSEC tends to help offset
trade diverting effects of CMEA over time. In the case of imports, on the other hand, CMEA
dummy turns out to be not significantly different from zero, regardless of whether it has been
introduced along with the BSEC dummy or all by itself. Again, common CMEA membership in the
past does not appear to affect trade flows.
23
As for trade creation (TC) in the sense applicable to BSEC, the following calculations
were made. These calculations distinguish two types of effects resulting from regional cooperation
within BSEC: Gross Trade Creation (GTC) effects upon the members, and External Trade Creation
Effects (ETC) on the third parties. Following Balassa (1967), GTC is used here to refer to total increase
in trade between members resulting from cooperation, regardless of whether extra trade created replaces
relatively inefficient domestic production or not. ETC, on the other hand, refers to total increase in trade
between members and non-members following the formal establishment of cooperation. With these
definitions in mind, the results in the first two lines of Tables 1 and 2 were used to calculate the
estimated values of  GTC and ETC effects of BSEC as in Aitken (1973). Since the ETC effects are
defined, in the present context, as the BSEC-caused increases in the exports/imports of BSEC15
members to/from non-members, the parameter estimates from the simple gravity equation without
the BSEC dummy were substituted into equations (1a)/(1b) so as to project the values of BSEC-
exports/imports that would have been observed had BSEC not been formed. Subtracting the
resulting export/import values from actual values of the respective trade flows would yield ETC
estimates presented in Tables 3a and 3b for exports, and Tables 4a and 4b for imports.
TABLE 3a. ESTIMATES of EXTERNAL EXPORT CREATION 1993 (Millions of Current USD)
Projected Values of Exports Estimates of ETC 
*
Countries Greece Romania Turkey Greece Romania Turkey
Hungary 43.4 66.4 80.1 -5.5 50.6 -42.6
Poland 64.7 92.5 152.2 -7.5 -72.3 82.6
Egypt 84.0 39.3 204.1 -7.1 61.7 -12.7
Iran 56.9 46.1 220.2 -42.6 35.7 69.3
Israel 43.1 23.7 150.1 50.5 30.2 -69.9
Jordan 10.4 6.0 37.7 14.9 36.9 67.3
Syria 49.6 29.9 213.0 -11.8 102.8 25.8
TOTALS 352.1 303.9 1,057.4 -6.7 142.8 94.0
* Actual exports minus the projected value of exports that would have been observed in the absence of
BSEC, as given in columns 2 to 4 (estimated using pooled data for 17 countries over the 1992-1994 period
without the dummy variable for BSEC membership).
TABLE 3b. ESTIMATES of EXTERNAL EXPORT CREATION 1994 (Millions of Current USD)
Projected Values of Exports Estimates of ETC 
*
Countries Greece Romania Turkey Greece Romania Turkey
Hungary 44.7 68.8 80.6 -5.1 92.1 -22.3
Poland 67.9 97.7 156.4 -0.1 -83.8 93.0
Egypt 90.1 42.4 214.4 12.6 115.4 -19.9
Iran 58.1 47.4 220.4 -49.0 -18.8 29.5
Israel 45.5 25.2 155.2 60.7 69.9 22.9
Jordan 14.0 8.1 50.0 14.9 27.5 61.7
Syria 46.4 28.1 194.9 2.5 117.7 59.0
TOTALS 366.7 317.7 1,071.9 36.5 320.0 223.9
* Actual exports minus the projected value of exports that would have been observed in the absence of
BSEC, as given in columns 2 to 4 (estimated using pooled data for 17 countries over the 1992-1994 period
without the dummy variable for BSEC membership).
The empirical results in Tables 3a and 3b reveal that total value of actual exports in the
1993- 1994 period by three BSEC members to non-member countries in the sample exceeds the total
projected values under the assumption of no BSEC-effect. This implies that the formation of BSEC led
                                                                                                                                                                    
23  This point could have been made more strongly if the set of reporting countries included other ex-
CMEA members joining BSEC than Romania.16
to external export creation. To be more precise, in both 1993-1994, Romania and Turkey managed to
export more to non-member countries under consideration than they would have, had BSEC not been
formed. Even Greece which, in 1993, earned slightly less than it would otherwise have, had net gains of
29.8 million dollars as the additional 36.5 million it received due to external export creation in 1994
offset its 1993 loss of  6.7 million dollars.
TABLE 4a. ESTIMATES of EXTERNAL IMPORT CREATION 1993 (Millions of Current USD)
Projected Values of Imports Estimates of ETC 
*
Countries Greece Romania Turkey Greece Romania Turkey
Hungary 59.8 134.7 68.6 -10.3 33.0 18.1
Poland 108.5 222.8 174.8 -60.3 -19.0 -83.7
Egypt 154.4 67.2 260.1 300.0 19.3 -15.5
Iran 92.6 86.5 297.7 671.5 517.6 369.3
Israel 59.4 32.4 165.1 25.6 23.0 -43.3
Jordan 7.7 4.5 22.7 -1.8 -0.7 2.0
Syria 72.9 45.1 270.5 -65.6 -36.3 -20.2
TOTALS 555.3 593.2 1,259.5 859.1 536.9 226.7
* Actual imports minus the projected value of imports that would have been observed in the absence of
BSEC, as given in columns 2 to 4 (based on pooled data for 17 countries over the 1992-1994 period
without the dummy variable for BSEC membership).
TABLE 4b. ESTIMATES of EXTERNAL IMPORT CREATION 1994 (Millions of Current USD)
Projected Values of Imports Estimates of ETC 
*
Countries Greece Romania Turkey Greece Romania Turkey
Hungary 62.0 140.4 70.3 -16.0 25.6 -14.9
Poland 115.9 239.0 184.5 -69.6 -20.6 -115.4
Egypt 170.1 74.4 283.3 286.3 48.5 -159.0
Iran 95.2 89.3 302.3 413.6 353.8 390.1
Israel 64.0 35.0 175.6 20.3 23.1 -49.7
Jordan 11.9 6.9 34.6 -5.2 -3.8 -19.9
Syria 65.9 40.9 241.6 -65.9 -33.4 -197.7
TOTALS 585.0 625.9 1,292.2 563.5 393.2 -166.5
* Actual imports minus the projected value of imports that would have been observed in the absence of
BSEC, as given in columns 2 to 4 (based on pooled data for 17 countries over the 1992-1994 period
without the dummy variable for BSEC membership).
A look at the results in Table 4a and 4b show that BSEC has had an even bigger impact on
imports from non-members. By these results, the formation of BSEC seems to have contributed to
the sizable increases in imports by Greece and Romania from non-BSEC countries considered.
While this is true also for Turkey in 1993, this country appears to have imported less form its non-17
BSEC trade partners in 1994 than it would have in the absence of BSEC. Like in the case of
external export creation for Greece, however, the two year total is positive implying that Turkey,
too, imported more from these countries over the 1993-1994 period than the case without BSEC.
Returning to the calculation of GTC, the parameter estimate for BSEC dummy is needed
for this purpose. Given that the GTC effects are defined as the BSEC-caused increases in the
exports/imports of BSEC members to other members, the estimated coefficient of BSEC dummy
(0.2018 in Table 1 or 0.1673 in Table 2) would be interpreted as the factor by which
exports/imports of three reporting countries to/from other members are increased. So, dividing
actual exports through the base of natural logarithm (i.e., the value of the dummy for members)
raised to 0.2018 (0.1673) would give the projected values of exports (imports) under the
counterfactual assumption of no cooperation through BSEC. The differences between actual and
projected values show the estimated values of GTC effects and are reported in tables below.
TABLE 5a. ESTIMATES of GROSS EXPORT CREATION 1993 (Millions of Current USD)
Projected Values of Exports Estimates of GTC 
*
Countries Greece Romania Turkey Greece Romania Turkey
Albania 107.4 2.5 30.9 24.0 0.6 6.9
Azerbaijan 0.2 0.8 55.7 nil 0.2 12.5
Bulgaria 257.9 83.6 70.5 57.7 18.7 15.8
Georgia 1.4 1.1 28.2 0.3 0.3 6.3
Greece - 55.6 96.5 - 12.4 21.6
Moldova 2.0 77.0 0.3 0.5 17.2 nil
Romania 75.9 - 123.9 17.0 - 27.7
Russian Federation 157.8 180.1 412.4 35.3 40.3 92.2
Turkey 126.2 245.8 - 28.2 55.0 -
Ukraine 26.9 85.6 32.2 6.0 19.1 7.2
TOTALS 755.7 732.1 850.6 169.0 163.8 190.2
* Actual exports minus the projected value of exports that would have been observed in the absence of
BSEC, as given in columns 2 to 4 (based on pooled data for 17 countries over the 1992-1994 period using
the estimated value of  the dummy variable for BSEC membership).18
TABLE 5b. ESTIMATES of GROSS EXPORT CREATION 1994 (Millions of Current USD)
Projected Values of Exports Estimates of GTC 
*
Countries Greece Romania Turkey Greece Romania Turkey
Albania 169.2 3.8 48.5 37.8 0.9 10.8
Azerbaijan 0.0 2.1 108.0 0.0 0.5 24.1
Bulgaria 327.8 83.5 109.2 73.3 18.7 24.4
Georgia 3.1 7.9 54.8 0.7 1.8 12.3
Greece - 115.4 138.0 - 25.8 30.9
Moldova 3.1 39.1 3.0 0.7 8.7 0.6
Romania 73.0 - 143.3 16.3 - 32.0
Russian Federation 192.9 169.4 670.4 43.1 37.9 149.9
Turkey 85.9 187.1 - 19.2 41.8 -
Ukraine 64.6 77.5 62.3 14.4 17.3 13.9
TOTALS 919.6 685.8 1337.5 205.5 153.4 298.9
* Actual exports minus the projected value of exports that would have been observed in the absence of
BSEC, as given in columns 2 to 4 (based on pooled data for 17 countries over the 1992-1994 period using
the estimated value of  the dummy variable for BSEC membership).
TABLE 6a. ESTIMATES of GROSS IMPORT CREATION 1993 (Millions of Current USD)
Projected Values of Imports Estimates of GTC 
*
Countries Greece Romania Turkey Greece Romania Turkey
Albania 13.5 0.1 1.5 2.5 0.0 0.3
Azerbaijan 0.0 4.8 28.7 0.0 0.9 5.2
Bulgaria 173.6 57.5 205.8 31.6 10.5 37.5
Georgia 0.1 0.0 18.5 0.0 0.0 3.4
Greece - 78.6 101.9 - 14.3 18.6
Moldova 0.3 72.1 24.5 0.0 13.1 4.5
Romania 57.5 - 254.4 10.5 - 46.3
Russian Federation 446.5 646.4 1,304.7 81.3 117.7 237.6
Turkey 121.3 128.3 - 22.1 23.4 -
Ukraine 29.8 112.7 399.9 5.4 20.5 72.8
TOTALS 842.6 1,100.5 2,339.9 153.4 200.4 426.2
* Actual imports minus the projected value of imports that would have been observed in the absence of
BSEC, as given in columns 2 to 4 (based on pooled data for 17 countries over the 1992-1994 period using
the estimated value of  the dummy variable for BSEC membership).19
TABLE 6b. ESTIMATES of GROSS IMPORT CREATION 1994 (Millions of Current USD)
Projected Values of Exports Estimates of GTC 
*
Countries Greece Romania Turkey Greece Romania Turkey
Albania 11.8 0.1 1.3 2.2 0.0 0.2
Azerbaijan 0.0 0.9 7.5 0.0 0.2 1.4
Bulgaria 260.9 49.9 165.4 47.5 9.1 30.1
Georgia 0.0 0.0 21.7 0.0 0.0 4.0
Greece - 75.6 88.9 - 13.8 16.2
Moldova 4.3 78.2 17.3 0.8 14.2 3.2
Romania 119.4 - 193.6 21.7 - 35.3
Russian Federation 449.9 829.2 884.3 81.9 151.0 161.0
Turkey 142.8 148.3 - 26.0 27.0 -
Ukraine 124.2 127.0 452.6 22.6 23.1 82.4
TOTALS 1113.3 1309.2 1832.6 202.7 238.4 333.8
* Actual imports minus the projected value of imports that would have been observed in the absence of
BSEC, as given in columns 2 to 4 (based on pooled data for 17 countries over the 1992-1994 period using
the estimated value of  the dummy variable for BSEC membership).
The results in Tables 5a through 6b are similar to those in Tables 3a to 4b in the sense that they
too point to BSEC-induced increases in trade among members. Differently from ETC estimates,
however, GTC estimates consistently indicate that formation of BSEC lead to no reduction in exports or
imports among members in any case, and increases both exports and imports in many cases, clearly
implying a rise in trade volumes among members.
4. Concluding Remarks
On the basis of evidence provided by the BSEC experience, this paper searched an answer to
whether regional economic cooperation in the broader sense could lead to any trade creation/diver-
sion effects even when the cooperating partners do not liberalize their trade policy among
themselves and/or harmonize their policy towards third parties. For this purpose, the paper
investigated the magnitude of trade creating effects of BSEC upon regional trade flows, and looked
into its role in hindering the diverted trade that had been going on among its members that were
once partners within CMEA.
The empirical results obtained within the framework of gravity model revealed that total
actual value of trade by BSEC members to non-members in the sample exceeded the total projected
values over the 1993-1994 indicating that the formation of BSEC led to external trade creation. As for
external export (import) creation by the individual members considered during the 1993-1994 period,
Turkey increased its exports (imports) by 317.9 (60.2) million dollars over the value it would have20
received from (paid for) exports to (imports from) non-BSEC members in the sample. During the same
period, the value of Romania’s actual exports to these countries exceeded the value of export earnings
this country would have collected in the absence of BSEC by 462.8 (930.1) million dollars. Even Greece
which, in 1993, earned slightly less than it would otherwise have, had net gains of 29.8 million dollars as
the additional 36.5 million it received due to external export creation in 1994 offset its 1993 loss. In
terms of imports, Greece spent much more (1,402.6 million dollars) than it would otherwise have.
As for gross trade creation, all three countries enjoyed higher values of exports to/imports from
other BSEC members in both 1993 and 1994. Of the three BSEC members considered, Turkey had the
highest increases with a two-year total of 389.1 million dollars in additional exports and 760.0 million
dollars in additional imports. The corresponding increases for Greece were estimated to be 374.5 million
and  256.1 million dollars for exports and imports, respectively, whereas estimated rise in Romania’s
trade stood at 317.2 million dollars for exports and 438.8 million dollars for imports.
The BSEC experience must be studied further and extensively as BSEC could act as a role
model for other regional initiatives. It has emerged as a regional initiative that encourages
cooperation and improved market access rather than protection and preferential treatment. It has
helped its members improve their ability to link up with the global economy and created welfare
gains through increased trade for its members. As such, BSEC experience has been consistent with
the ideals of globalizm through regional cooperation as OECD and other international organizations
recently began to promote. The support provided to such regional integration efforts is based on the
argument that trade flows and foreign direct investment in neighboring countries act as powerful
engines for economic growth and development of integrating economies, and regional integration
could therefore serve to globalization by helping these countries integrate into the global economy
(OECD, 1996). Even though it did not emerge as a regional integration per se, this was one of  the
goals that was explicitly set for BSEC at the time of its formation. In fact, the BSEC Summit
Declaration reflected an early awareness of the potential role that regional cooperation could play
in this area, and assigned a high priority to assistance to transition members struggling to get
connected to the world economy.21
REFERENCES
Aitken, N. D. (1973). "The Effect of the EEC and EFTA on European Trade: A Temporal
Cross-Section Analysis," American Economic Review, 63, 881-892.
Balassa, B. (1967). "Trade Creation and Trade Diversion in the European Common Market,"
Economic Journal, 77, 1-21.
Baldwin, R.E. (1994). Towards an Integrated Europe, London: CEPR.
Bikker, J.A. (1987). "An International Trade Flow Model with Substitution," Kyklos, 40,
315-337.
BSEC (1995). Handbook of Documents (vol. I), Istanbul: BSEC Permanent International
Secretariat.
Deardorff, A.V. (1984). "Testing Trade Theories and Predicting Trade Flows," in R.W.
Jones and P.B. Kenen (eds.), Handbook of International Economics (vol. I), Amsterdam:
Elsevier Publishers. pp. 467-517.
Éltetõ, A. and T. Szemlér (1996). “Analysis of French-Hungarian Trade Relations: A
Gravity-Model Approach,” Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute for World Economics
Working Paper No. 66.
Erzan, R., C. Holmes and R. Safadi (1992). "How Changes in the Former CMEA Area
may Affect International Trade in Manufactures," The World Bank International Economics
Department Working Paper No. WPS 973.
Gultekin, N.B. and A. Mumcu (1996).  "Black Sea Economic Cooperation," in V. Mastny
and R.C. Nation (eds.), Turkey between East and West: New Challenges for a Rising Regional
Power, Boulder: Westview Press. pp. 179-201.
Haveman, J. and D. Hummels (1997). "What can We Learn from Bilateral Trade? Gravity
and Beyond," Manuscript, Purdue University.
Havrylysyn, O. and L. Pritchett (1991). "European Trade Patterns after the Transition,"
The World Bank Country Economics Department Working Paper No. WPS 748.
Maurel, M. and G. Cheikbossian (1998). "The New Geography of Eastern European
Trade," Kyklos, 51, 45-71.
OECD (1996). Regional Integration and Transition Economies: The Case of the Baltic
Rim, Paris: OECD.
OECD (1997). Designing New Trade Policies in the Transition Economies, Paris:
OECD.
Oguledo, V.I. and C.R. MacPhee (1994). "Gravity Models: A Reformulation and an
Application to Discriminatory Trade Arrangements," Applied Economics, 26, 107-120.22
PABSEC (1997). PABSEC (the Magazine of the Parliamentary Assembly of BSEC), vol. 7
(June).
Sayan, S. (1996). "The Importance of Transportation and Communications Infrastructure
for BSEC Members," Discussant's Comments presented at the BSEC-Bosphorus University
Workshop on "The Black Sea, Caspian and Mediterranean Seas: A Turntable between Three
Continents," Istanbul, December 5-6.
Sayan, S. (1997). "The Black Sea Economic Cooperation Project: A Substitute for or A
Complement to Globalization Efforts in the Middle East and the Balkans?" Paper presented at the
Conference on “Globalization: Challenges and Opportunities for Development in the ERF Region”
Cosponsored by ERF, KIST and Kuwait University, 18-20 October, 1997.
Sayan, S. and O. Zaim (1998). "Black Sea Economic Cooperation Project," in L.
Rittenberg (ed.), The Political Economy of Turkey in the Post-Soviet Era: Going West and
Looking East, Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers. pp. 115-136.
Tinbergen, J. (1962). Shaping the World Economy, New York: The Twentieth Century
Fund.
Togan, S. (1994). "Black Sea Economic Co-operation, Economic Co-operation Organisation,
Turkic Republics and Turkey: Possibilities for Regional Economic Integration," Paper presented at the
conference on "European Union, Turkey and Eurasia: New Trends in EU-Turkey Relations," Istanbul,
September 22-23.
van Bergeijk, P.A.G. and H. Oldersma (1990). “Détente, Market-oriented Reform and
German Unification: Potential Consequences for the World Trade System,” Kyklos, 43, 599-609.